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Verify Action MCP Server

@Armada735

基本情報

カテゴリ

その他

ライセンス

MIT

トランスポート

stdio

作者

Armada735

投稿者

test test

Verify Action MCP Server について

MCP server issuing HMAC-attested receipts for AI agent tool-call evidence (verify_action_receipt.v0 reference impl)

#agent-verification#ai-agent#llm-agent#integrity#guardrail#audit-trail#audit-log#agent-observability#mcp-server#claude-code#cursor#cline#codex#windsurf#aider#continue#cross-vendor#free#third-party#hmac-attested-receipt#post-action-verification#tool-call-evidence#tool-call-audit#evidence-verification#claim-verification#silent-failure-detection#content-addressed-receipt#python#stdlib

Verify Action MCP Server の設定

以下の設定を使って、このサーバーを MCP 対応クライアントに追加してください。

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "verify-action": {
      "url": "https://verify.armadalab.dev/mcp"
    }
  }
}

Verify Action MCP Server のツール

ツール一覧はまだありません

この掲載には表示できるツール一覧がまだありません。サーバーにツールがないという意味ではありません。対応機能はプロジェクトのドキュメントをご確認ください。

上のボタンでサーバーのエンドポイントに接続し、ツール一覧を取得できます。

概要

What is Verify Action?

Verify Action is a post-action verification service for AI agent tool calls. Submit a (claim, evidence) pair and get back a 4-value verdict and a tamper-evident hosted receipt that downstream agents, CI steps, or deployment pipelines can use to continue, block, or escalate. It checks whether supplied evidence is internally consistent with the supplied claim — it does not independently access the caller’s database, code repository, or APIs.

How to use Verify Action?

Configure it as an MCP server (e.g., in claude_desktop_config.json with transport http pointing to https://verify.armadalab.dev/mcp). The agent then has a verify_action tool available. You can also call the REST API directly (POST /verify) or self-host the pure Python stdlib service (no pip install; clone and run ./start.sh).

Key features of Verify Action

  • Post-action evidence verification for AI agent tool calls
  • Four canonical verdicts: verified, contradicted, insufficient_evidence, unsafe_to_verify
  • HMAC-SHA256-attested receipts for tamper-evident logging
  • Primary verifier for code diffs; experimental verifiers for DB ops, file ops, and API calls
  • Self-hostable with pure Python stdlib; no dependencies
  • Built-in PII guard rejects email, phone, credit-card, and JP personal‑ID patterns

Use cases of Verify Action

  • Verify a code diff matches the agent’s claimed change before merging
  • Block a deployment step when evidence contradicts the claimed database operation
  • Escalate to a human when insufficient evidence is provided for a claimed API call
  • Ensure a downstream CI job only proceeds on a “verified” verdict from prior agent action

よくある質問

1

What exactly does Verify Action examine?

It examines the supplied evidence object against the supplied claim using rule‑based verifiers. It does not access external systems; the trust boundary depends on the evidence kind — strongest for `code_diff` (the diff is the evidence), weaker for kinds that rely on the caller faithfully reporting external state.

2

What are the four possible verdicts?

`verified` (proceed), `contradicted` (block), `insufficient_evidence` (request more evidence), and `unsafe_to_verify` (escalate to human — the verifier itself raised an exception).

3

How does the receipt trust model work in v0?

Receipts are HMAC‑SHA256 symmetric‑key signatures — they prove this service issued the verdict under a known key id. They are **tamper‑evident hosted log entries**, not third‑party cryptographic attestations. Public‑key (Ed25519) receipts are planned for a future v1.

4

What are the current limitations?

The service is rule‑based only (no LLM‑as‑judge), does not decompose sub‑claims, and does not correlate traces across calls. The generic evidence handler is conservative and often returns `insufficient_evidence`.

5

How does Verify Action handle privacy?

IP addresses are SHA‑256‑hashed with a rotating salt. Claims and evidence are written to private trace logs with 30‑day retention. A structural PII guard rejects email, phone, JP postal codes, national‑ID‑shapes, passport patterns, and credit‑card‑shape digits. Individual traces stay private; only aggregate findings may be published.

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